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SETTLEMENT OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION INCLUDING
CLASS TYPE ACTIONS AND MULTIPLE DEFENDANT LAWSUITS
ROBERT F. DOBBIN*
Settlement is one of the first practical considerations a lawyer should
make in today's modern antitrust practice. The adage is, "A fair settlement
is better than a bad lawsuit," or, stated another way, "A fair settlement
is better than a good trial." Apparently, the American antitrust bar recog-
nizes the particular applicability of these adages to antitrust treble damage
actions. Professor Milton Handler of Columbia Law School has observed
that not one antitrust treble damage class action has been tried since amend-
ments to Rule 23 became effective in 1966. Apparently, all have been
settled or otherwise disposed of. I wish to spend a few moments with
you discussing some of the legal problems involved in settling antitrust
treble damage class actions. Not all of the cases I will cite are antitrust
cases, but most are. All of the cases I cite are class actions, and I think
their holdings are equally applicable to antitrust actions.
Let's assume a treble damage antitrust action has been commenced
in federal court against your client. The action will typically allege a
violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and typically will involve
multiple defendants combined in an alleged conspiracy. Let's further as-
sume that the action has only recently been commenced, no class action
determination has been made, and a vigorous discovery program has started.
Your client wants out of the litigation and is willing to pay to do so.
Can you get your client out of the action prior to there being a class
action determination and consequently prior to notice to class members?
Federal rule 23(e), "Dismissal or compromise," states:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the ap-
proval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs. (emphasis added).
To state the question more generally: Must there be a determination
under rule 23(c) (1) whether the action may be maintained as a class
action before the provisions of 23(e) become operative? At least two
courts of appeal, the Third1 and Ninth' Circuits, and two district courts,'
following the lead of Judge Fullam in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Ana-
* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Dobbin's remarks were delivered to the Sixth Annual
Antitrust Institute in November 1972. Mr. Dobbin wishes to thank Richard F. Russell, his
associate, upon whose research this paper is based.
1 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970).
2 Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972).
3 Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304
F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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conda American Brass Co.,4 have answered that question in the nega-
tive. The Philadelphia Electric case corresponds with the case assumed
above. Some of the parties agreed on a settlement and sought court ap-
proval and dismissal of the respective plaintiffs' claims as to them. Judge
Fullam held that an action "must be assumed to be a class action for pur-
poses of dismissal or compromise under 23 (e) unless and until a contrary
determination is made under 23 (c) (1)."' The notice requirement of rule
23 (e) was held to be applicable to the proposed settlement and the motion
seekifig court approval of those settlements was held in abeyance pending
a determination of the class action question and further order of the court.
The requirements of rule 23(e) most likely apply, then, at the com-
mencement of an action designated by the plaintiff as a class action. These
requirements cannot be avoided by reaching a compromise before the court
has determined that the action may be maintained as a class action.
I. ATTEMPTS TO BY-PAss RULE 23(e)
While the approval provision of rule 23 (e) applies to all dismissals
or compromises of class actions, the notice provision applies only to volun-
tary dismissals by the plaintiff(s). Nevertheless, attempts to avoid notice
to class members of the termination of a class action, other than on the
merits, have met with little success.
In Rothman v. Gould6 a settlement offer was made to the named plain-
tiff individually. Plaintiff sought an order determining that the action
could not be maintained as a class action, no contrary determination having
been made. Plaintiff's motion was unopposed, but the court, noting the
unprotected interests of the remaining class members, denied the motion
and ordered that a form of notice to the class be presented to the court.
An attempt by plaintiffs to amend their complaint to strike the class action
allegations and effect a settlement of the remaining individual claims failed
in Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp.7 Even though the proposed amendment
had been filed at a time when it should have been allowed as a matter
of course, Judge Decker felt that to allow the amendment to stand would
result in an evasion of rule 23(e). Noting the potential harm to absent
class members and the undeserved leverage conferred upon plaintiffs as
a result of allowing such amendments, the judge vacated the amendment
and disallowed the stipulation of dismissal. Thus it appears that attempts
to avoid rule 23(e) by seeking a determination that the action is not a
class action or by seeking to amend the complaint to drop class action al-
legations have met with little favor. But to attempt to give new life to a
442 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
5Id. at 326.
6 14 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1541 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
7 50.F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
[Vol. 34
ANTITRUST SYMPOSIUM
clich6 that has fallen into disuse, "There is new light at the end of the
tunnel !"
Rule 23 (e) does not, by its terms, appear to apply to settlements negoti-
ated with individual nonparty class members. This principle was applied
recently in Weightwatchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weightwatchers In-
ternational, Inc.,8 a treble damage class action by a franchisee on behalf
of a class of all franchisees against their common franchisor charging that
the franchisor -had imposed maximum prices that could be charged by fran-
chisees to customers. The management of the franchisor thought it unde-
sirable for the franchisees' clientele to learn that the franchisees were seek-
ing to be free to charge higher prices. But, nevertheless, the franchisor
sought to renegotiate the franchise contracts with nonparty franchisees.
The lower court by order allowed the defendant-franchisor to negotiate set-
tlement with individual class members and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' appeal as one from nonappealable
order. In doing so, the Second Circuit made the following interesting
comments:
Indeed, we are unable to perceive any legal theory that would endow a
plaintiff who has brought what would have been a "spurious" class action
under former Rule 23 with a right to prevent negotiation of settlements
between the defendant and other potential members of the class who are
of a mind to do this; it is only the settlement of the class action itself
without court approval that F.R. Civ. P. 23(e) prohibits.9
Here, even if defendant should succeed in settling with so many fran-
chisees that the court will be forced to deny class action status, plaintiffs'
complaint will remain untouched. As we have, in essence, already noted,
plaintiff has no legally protected right to sue on behalf of other franchisees
who prefer to settle; F.R. Civ. P. 23(e), requiring court approval of the
dismissal or compromise of a class action, does not bar non-approved set-
tlements with individual members which have no effect upon the rights of
others.' 0
Thus, this case suggests that a defendant can settle, without court ap-
proval and without notice to the class, the claims of individual class mem-
bers so long as the rights of the alleged class at large are not compromised.
For those of you who are plaintiffs' lawyers, there is no need to worry
about defendants pulling the rug from under your class. In the Weight-
watchers case the district court did impose limitations upon defendant's
right to negotiate. The principal limitations were: (1) no negotiation with-
out class members' lawyers being present; and (2) no negotiation except
after five days' notice of the place and time of the negotiation given to
8455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972), dismissing an appeal from 55 F.RD. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
9 455 F.2d at 773 (footnotes omitted).
"o Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
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the class action plaintiff's lawyer. If the lawyer showed up at the negotia-
tion, he was allowed to advise the negotiating class member of the member's
rights. Finally, for practical reasons, the right to negotiate with individual
class members recognized by this case would only seem applicable to a
situation involving a relatively small class."'
Well then, is there no way, except by individual settlements with each
class member, to get your client out of the litigation before a class action
determination and notice to the class? The answer is yes and no.
In the Philadelphia Electric'2 case, some defendants did come to early
written agreements with plaintiffs' attorneys as to the terms of settlement.
Court approval of those agreements was left hanging while plaintiffs prose-
cuted the remaining alleged conspirators. In due time and after protracted
discovery, all remaining defendants saw the wisdom of settling and the
earlier reached settlements were finally approved as part of an overall settle-
ment.
The advantage of this course is that, if you settle early, your client
will probably get out cheaper, as happened in Philadelphia Electric, and
the substantial expenses of discovery are avoided. The disadvantage is
that your client is not wholly out of the lawsuit, and plaintiffs' attorneys,
will probably extract from your client a written promise to be at least
subject to document and deposition discovery while the case proceeds
against others.
As you may know, the American College of Trial Lawyers has recom-
mended certain changes in rule 23. I understand these recommendations,
and others, are under consideration by the Advisory Committee to the Su-
preme Court on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One of the recom-
mended changes, if adopted, would eliminate the notice requirements if
the dismissal is without prejudice, or with prejudice to the class representa-
tive only, provided there is no compensation paid or promised to the class
representative or his attorney. The proposed change apparently would
not be applicable in a settlement situation unless the settlement were a
capitulation by plaintiff.
11 In Weightwatchers, the maximum class size was between 44 and 53 franchisees, depending
upon whether defendant's or plaintiff's contentions were accepted. However, in a stipulation
filed with and approved by the court, the parties agreed that there were actually only nine
potential members of the putative class that plaintiff sought to represent. The diminution
of alleged class size was due, inter alia, to written statements from a number of franchisees
to the effect that defendant never committed the alleged antitrust law violations and releases
or agreements to release defendant from any claim for the alleged violations from other fran-
chisees. On the basis of these and other stipulated facts, the court approved an amendment
of the complaint striking class action allegations and dismissal of the class action -with prejudice
and without costs, preserving only the claim of the one named plaintiff. This clalm was
subsequently settled and the action discontinued.
1242 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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II. JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT PRIOR TO
APPROVAL OF THE COMPROMISE
In related antitrust cases involving multiple defendants and numerous
plaintiffs representing a number of national or regional classes, early judicial
involvement is desirable, if not a necessity. In such cases, defendants gen-
erally face an array of plaintiffs, each plaintiff or group of plaintiffs under-
taking to represent a class of aggrieved persons. The aim of the defendants
is to settle as many claims as it can with one settlement offer. Generally,
this is attempted by making one offer to each group in an effort to reach
a "global" settlement with that category of claimants. Since procedural
mechanics designed for settlements between one or more defendants and
a single class of plaintiffs do not lend themselves directly to these more
complicated cases, innovation by court and counsel is called for. A discus-
sion of two recent major antitrust cases is illustrative.
The Plumbing Fixture"3 cases were actions brought against the manu-
facturers of certain plumbing fixtures by builder-owners, states, cities and
other public bodies, wholesalers, retailers, and plumbing and general con-
tractors. Defendants reached separate settlement agreements in the form
of proposed orders with the wholesaler and contractor plaintiffs. These
settlement orders provided for the establishment of temporary national
classes of those in each category and for the publication and sending of
notice to prospective members of the temporary national classes. Class
members were to be given the option of accepting the settlement or exclud-
ing themselves therefrom and prosecuting their claims against defendants.
The settlement orders were the subject of scheduled hearings to determine
whether the temporary classes should be determined and held to be perma-
nent classes and whether judgment should be entered against those who
had not excluded themselves from participation.
The settlement order dealing with the conditional settlement offered
to the contractors was challenged by some contractor-plaintiffs. They ar-
gued that the order established, without a hearing, a national class and
national class representatives and approved a settlement with that class,
thus prejudicing the rights of those who did not wish to accept the settle-
ment, but might wish to continue with national or regional class litigation.
The court concluded that the order was consistent with proper procedure.
The order did not give final approval to the settlement: the settling plain-
tiffs or defendants could still withdraw the settlement agreement, and even
if the settlement were approved, those excluding themselves were free to
litigate their claims either individually or as a class.
In response to an argument that a rule 23(c) (1) determination of
the class should have been made initially and class representatives then
IsPhiladelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323
F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (dealing with settlement offers to the wholesalers and contractors).
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
appointed to conduct settlement negotiations, the court pointed to the harsh
results that could have occurred if such a procedure were used. If the
class were determined first, the court noted, the class members would be
locked into any subsequent settlement approved by the court, whereas under
the procedure established by the court, those who preferred to litigate rather
than accept settlement would be free to do so.
In the Plumbing Fixture cases, Chief Judge Lord and Judge Harvey
used a procedure whereby the class determination requirements of rule
23(c) (1), the notice requirements of rule 23(c) (2), and the approval and
notice requirements of rule 23 (e) were incorporated into one simplified,
single step. The procedures established in that case left the class members
with flexibility to decide, upon consideration of the proposed settlement,
whether they wished to accept it, and at the same time gave the defendants
a (somewhat dubious) chance to achieve the "global" settlement they
sought.
The settlement in those cases was approved by both the district court 4
and the Third Circuit.15 In doing so, the court of appeals made two signif-
icant statements. First, a class member who does not opt out, as allowed
under rule 23(c) (2), whose objections to the settlement are overruled
and who thereby obtains the benefit of the settlement, still has standing
to appeal the final judgment and to seek to upset the settlement. Second,
the Third Circuit cautioned that it is preferable in the first instance for
the court to appoint a class representative to conduct negotiations with
defendants. Here an unofficial (not appointed by the court) class repre-
sentative had rejected defendants' last settlement offer and had terminated
settlement negotiations with defendants; however another unofficial class
representative took up negotiations with defendants and accepted the
figure rejected by the first representative. This figure was submitted to
and approved by the court; the court granted approval because the settle-
ment was otherwise fair and equitable.
The Antibiotic Antitrust Litigation16 involved some 150 actions charg-
ing patent fraud and invalidity and a conspiracy to violate the antitrust
laws. The private plaintiffs sued after the Department of Justice had filed
a criminal antitrust case against the same defendants. Following a jury
verdict against them in the criminal action, defendants offered to settle
26 of the actions brought by private hospitals and 66 other actions involv-
ing state governmental entities and wholesale and retail druggists. The
14 Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 322
F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
15Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
16 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd, 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, Coder Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S.
871 (1971).
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proceedings which ensued from the latter offer are illustrative of judicial
involvement in the settlement process in complex antitrust cases.
Defendants offered $100,000,000 in settlement of all claims of govern-
ment entities (other than the federal government) arising out of purchases
of the subject antibiotics or out of payments to recipients of welfare aid
and claims of wholesalers, retailers, and individual consumers arising out
of their purchases, including claims of states on behalf of their citizens.
The offer was in the form of a settlement plan. The plan provided that:
(1) appropriate actions would be determined to be maintained as class
actions; (2) required notices would be sent to class members; (3) if there
were "substantial and material" exclusions or "opt outs," defendants could
withdraw; (4) if defendants did not withdraw, the $100,000,000 settlement
figure would be reduced to reflect exclusions; (5) accepting plaintiffs could
present to the court proposed plans for allocation of the global settlement
amount and, if plaintiffs could not agree on a plan, defendants could choose
any plan or modification thereof; (6) the agreed upon plan would then
be submitted to the court for approval; (7) costs incurred in the settlement
procedure were to be paid from the settlement amount; and (8) if the
settlement were approved, all claims covered thereby would be satisfied
or terminated.
After the offer of settlement was accepted in principle by nearly all
plaintiffs, the court entered an order providing for a "temporary national
class action" for government entities and a "consolidated wholesaler-retailer
class action." The "temporary national class" was to comprise two sub-
classes: (1) government hospitals and institutions (city, county, and state);
and (2) individual consumers. Each state was allowed the options of re-
jecting the offer of settlement by notice excluding themselves, filing a state-
ment indicating its wish to participate in the settlement without being
included in the "temporary national class," or electing to become a member
of the class. For those states accepting the offer, the order determined
that their actions be maintained as class actions. The order further deter-
mined that the "consolidated wholesaler-retailer class action" was to be
maintained as a class action and the members of the class were specified.
The order stated that the class action determination and the establishment
of classes were for the purpose of administering the proposed settlement.
The above order was directed to the states as notice to members of
the "temporary national class" and most states accepted the offer of settle-
ment. Notices were ordered to be sent to class members in the various
class actions and included a provision that a class member had until a
certain date by which to file a claim if he wished to participate in the
settlement. They also established an earlier date by which a class member
had to exclude himself from participation in the settlement.
When the exclusions were received and defendants did not elect to
19731
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withdraw, allocation plans were submitted by a number of plaintiffs pur-
suant to the settlement plan. Following further negotiations and compro-
mise, the defendants elected an allocation plan that was a modified version
of a plan submitted by the state of Alabama. At the request of counsel
for certain plaintiffs, the court then entered an order to show cause why
notice should not be sent to class members pursuant to rule 23(e) in
the form as annexed to the order. After a hearing the court redrafted
a form of notice and such notices, advising of a hearing to be held on
the proposed compromise, were sent to those class members who had filed
claims. Judge Wyatt ultimately approved the settlement, including the
overall plan for allocating the settlement fund, and his approvil was af-
firmed on appeal by the Second Circuit 7 and the Supreme Court. 8
In both the Plumbing Fixture and Antibiotic cases, classes were first
determined only in the context of settlement discussions. The value of
the overall settlement for each class was negotiated and known. In the
Antibiotic cases, after the "opt outs" were known, defendants reduced their
settlement offer to about $82 million, but despite their agreement to pay
that sum, defendants are still involved in major litigation now in Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul with those classes and members that opted out of the settle-
ments. That experience, from a defendant's viewpoint, suggests the advis-
ability of striving for early class action determinations outside the settle-
ment context.
Rule 23(c) (1) mandates that "as soon as practicable after commence-
ment of an action as a class action, the court shall order whether it is
to be so maintained." By local court rule in some districts, that means
within 60 or 90 days of filing the complaint. The purpose for requiring
early determination was to prevent "fence sitting" or "one way interven-
tion." Potential plaintiffs would simply watch the class representatives
prosecute their common claims. If the representative tried the claim and
won or settled, then the fence sitters would know on which side of the
fence they belonged. If the representative lost the case, nary a word would
be heard from the fence sitters who did not want to be bound by such
an inequitable result. Heads plaintiffs win! Tails defendants lose!
If there is an early class action determination, then the defendants
can better enumerate the number of plaintiffs they are up against and,
unless class members take the affirmative step of opting out, they will
thereafter be bound by what the class representative does, including agree-
ing to a settlement.
Another device, which, if allowed in the court's discretion, tends to
facilitate settlements, is requiring class members to "opt in" in order to
participate in the settlement. As already noted, the initial notice to class
17 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
18Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (10971).
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members in the Antibiotic cases included a provision requiring those wish-
ing to participate in the settlement amount to file proof of their claims
by a specified date. In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American
Brass Co. 9 Judge Fullam directed a procedure whereby the claims of passive
members of the class were to be barred "unless within a reasonable period
they file a brief statement of their intent to prove damages." In fact,
it was not until after the deadline for class members to file a statement
with the court that nonsettling defendants realized that the class, and
therefore their potential exposure, was not as large as first thought. This
immediately lead to settlement.
In the one case found in the Sixth Circuit, Biechele v. Norfolk & West-
rn Ry.2° plaintiffs sued an operator of a coal loading facility, seeking
injunctive relief and damages for nuisance. The notice to class members
required those desiring to present damage claims to enter an appearance
by a certain date. Several hundred persons joined in the damage action
and this delineated the class for the purposes of recovery.
This procedure as utilized by courts is fully in accord with rule 23.
Rule 23(d) (2) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may
make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring, for the protection of mem-
bers of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they con-
sider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action. (emphasis added)
Thus, Professor Moore has stated that, "A court may, however, give a
dual or an additional notice, under [rule 23] (d) (2) to class members
who do not opt out, and require them to take some affirmative action
as a condition of ultimate recovery."'" However, as the language implies,
whether such orders will be entered lies in the court's discretion. The
weight of case authority fully sanctions this procedure.2 1
There are several distinct advantages which accrue to the court and
the parties if some affirmative action is required of class members. First,
it will compel those absent class members who have meritorious claims
to step forward to advise the court and parties of that fact. Second, and
flowing from the first benefit, once it is known affirmatively who is in
19 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
20 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
21 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 5 23.55, at 1161 (2d ed. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
22See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, Herriman v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.,
43 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
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and who is out of the litigation, it allows the parties, at both counsel
tables, to realistically assess the magnitude of potential recovery on plain-
tiffs' side and potential damages on the defendants' side. Judge Fullam
succinctly summarized the benefits which can flow from compelling absent
class members to take "some kind of minimal affirmative action":
In the nature of things, it can be expected that many class members
will remain passive. Under the old rule, their claims were neither ad-
judicated nor guarded against. Under the new rule, passive members
will be bound by the judgment; but if they have no intention of proving
their individual damages, it is to everyone's advantage to know it early.
To bar the claims of the passive members unless within a reasonable period
they file a brief statement of their intent to prove damages would reveal
the true scope of the litigation, and would either greatly reduce the trou-
ble and expense of any subsequent notices which may be required, or
provide a basis for informed re-appraisal of the class-action question un-
der 23 (c) (1).23
Third, and also flowing from the first benefit, once it is known affirmatively
who is in and who is out of this litigation, steps can effectively be taken
toward an adjudication of such issues as remoteness, standing, and passing-
On.
III. COURT CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
Approval or disapproval of a proposed compromise is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court. In exercising that discretion the court
should approve the compromise if the settlement offered is "fair, reasonable
and adequate." The burden of showing to the court that the settlement
meets these criteria is upon its proponents.
In the Antibiotic cases Judge Wyatt stated that the most important
factor to be considered in determining whether to approve a compromise
is "the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against
the amount offered in settlement ... [,] sometimes referred to as the like-
lihood of success.""' This view is consistent with the guidelines recently
laid down by the Supreme Court for use by a bankruptcy court in consider-
ing compromises arrived at in the course of reorganization proceedings.2 5
In the Antibiotic cases the court reviewed the likelihood of plaintiffs' success
should the cases go to trial. Noting that the defendants had been in-
vestigated and actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice (the conviction on criminal charges had subse-
quently been reversed and the case remanded) and that little or no hard
evidence of an antitrust conspiracy had been found, the court estimated
plaintiffs' chances of success as slight, certainly no better than 50-50. The
23 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. at 459 (emphasis added).
24 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 740.
25 Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968).
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court also noted other troublesome questions of law. Superimposed on
this review of the merits of plaintiffs' case, however, was the caution that
the court must not attempt to try or decide the merits of the controversy.
Among other factors considered were the expertise and experience of coun-
sel for representative plaintiffs, the extent of support for the settlement
from interested parties, and the presence or absence of good faith bargain-
ing. Similar considerations were suggested by Judge Harvey in his prelimi-
nary review of the reasonability of the settlement offer before the court
in Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp.26
Norman v. McKee27 was a derivative action on behalf of investors in
an investment fund. There the court disapproved a proposed settlement
because it found that the steps which defendants offered to take in response
to plaintiffs' claims would benefit, primarily, only future investors in the
fund and, in any case, were required to be taken as a result of a prior
settlement by defendants with the SEC. The court stated that while the
judgment of named parties advised by competent counsel was entitled to
considerable weight, a court should not approve a settlement which on
its face was inadequate and therefore unfair to members of the represented
class. The case demonstrates that boiler-plate approval of settlements by
district courts is not to be expected.
IV. APPEAL OR APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF COMPROMISES
As indicated previously, approval or disapproval of a proposed settle-
ment lies within the discretion of the trial judge. Therefore, such a deci-
sion will be reversed on appeal only upon a clear showing that the trial
judge abused his discretion.28 Such an abuse might be found if the trial
court rendered a boiler-plate approval without sufficient facts at its disposal
or refused to allow objectors to develop facts showing the impropriety of
the settlement. In Newman v. Stein29 the court based its affirmance on
the premise that
in any case there is a range of reasonableness with respect to a settlement
-a range which recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any par-
ticular case and the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent in tak-
ing any litigation to completion .... 30
The trial judge would not be reversed, the court continued, if the settlement
were within the range described. There the court found the applicable
decisional law sufficiently unsettled to merit approval of a settlement.
26 323 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
27290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
2 8 See, e.g., Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (-d Cir. 1972); West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
29464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972).
30Id. at 693.
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Appeals may be taken by class members or class representatives from
either the approval or disapproval of a proposed settlement. If a class
member has been given notice of the trial court proceedings, however,
he cannot withhold his objections to approval of a compromise and still
expect to be granted review by an appellate court. Some cases might
be illustrative of the appellate process.
Cohen v. Young,31 decided by the Sixth Circuit 30 years ago, is still
good law. It was an appeal from the approval of a settlement in a stock-
holders' derivative suit. Appellant had appeared and opposed the settle-
ment and sought to intervene. The trial court approved the settlement
based on the recommendation of approval by counsel for plaintiffs of rec-
ord. It also denied appellant's petition to intervene and refused to allow
appellant to present evidence.
The court of appeals held that appellant, a stockholder of the corpora-
tion, had standing to appeal the approval of the settlement since he and
all other stockholders would be bound thereby. The court further held
that the trial court had abused its discretion in following the recommenda-
tion of counsel without independent consideration of the evidence and in
refusing further evidence proffered by appellant.
This case has been followed very recently in this circuit. In Sertic v.
Cuyahoga County,32 a class action case, albeit under the labor laws, the
Sixth Circuit said:
Under Rule 23(e), FRCP, a compromise entered into between the
parties to a class action must be approved by the court "an& notice of the
proposed . . . compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
such manrter as the court directs." The above language is mandatory and
where a compromise is negotiated between the parties, thereby forming the
basis of the final judgment, omission of the notice requirement by the
court is dear error and is prejudicial to the rights of the members of the
class....
In Cohen v. Young, supra, 127 F.2d at 725, this court established that
the Rule requiring notice to class members of a proposed compromise
carries with it the obligation of the court to consider any available evi-
dence from such members and to include in the record the documents re-
lied upon to reach the compromise a3
This holding of the Sixth Circuit reflects the actual practice in antitrust
class actions. While in a typical commercial litigation the settlement pa-
pers filed in court may be nothing more than a one page stipulation of
settlement and dismissal, that is not sufficient for court approval of a class
action settlement. Ordinarily, there must be a formal notice of motion
seeking approval of the settlement. The motion should be supported by
31 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942).
32 16 FED. RULES SRV. 2d 263 (6th Cir. 1972).
33 Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 34
ANTITRUST SYMPOSIUM
affidavits of counsel outlining the legal issues in the case, the difficulties
of proof involved, the discovery had and its results, plaintiffs' estimate
of potential liability, and the amount to be paid in settlement. Briefs in
support of the settlement should be filed, and, depending upon the court's
preference, counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants should be prepared
to present oral argument in support of the settlement.
Now, let me give some practical random considerations respecting set-
tlements. First, your ultimate objective should be to get your client out
of the litigation permanently so he never need be faced with the same
claims again. To do that you may wish to re-examine the class definition
already established by the court. Perhaps it is too narrowly constituted
in terms of geography, product line, or time. Therefore, in the settlement
you have to agree with plaintiffs as to the final composition of the class
and convince the court to accept your agreement.
Second, as a defendant's lawyer, generally you should not want your
client to give up one cent until he is out of the litigation permanently.
Therefore, your settlement agreement should be fashioned so that your
client does not disgorge any money until, at the earliest, one day after
the expiration of time to appeal from the final judgment you have attained
dismissing the action (needless to say, without any appeal having been
filed).
Third, not only do you want a settlement bar against all claims that
were actually asserted, but against all claims that could have been asserted.
For example, in recent securities litigation plaintiffs' claims were made
under only certain sections of the securities laws, and it was recognized
that on the same facts other sections could have been asserted. It was ex-
pressly provided in the court approved settlement that theories of recovery
not pleaded but which could have been pleaded were barred by the settle-
ment. This point and the first point about re-examining the class definition
go hand in glove.
Fourth, a defendant's lawyer should not want his client to bear the
expenses of either sending notice to the class members or administering
the distribution of the settlement funds. In a settlement both of these
expenses, as far as I have observed, are payable, with court approval, out
of the settlement fund. They can be very substantial expenses. As far
as administering the distribution of the settlement fund is concerned, usu-
ally plaintiffs' attorneys are only too glad to oblige or, in some instances,
the court will appoint a special master to do so.
Finally, you wish to assure that your client really gets the benefit of
a total settlement bar to other claims. Therefore, you have a direct interest
in the form of notice given to class members and the manner of giving
notice to class members. Our Constitution requires "due process," and due
process under the rule-rule 23 (c) (2) -requires "the best notice practica-
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ble under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort." Consequently, you can-
not be indifferent to the notice requirements if your client is to achieve
the greatest possible benefit for thq sums advanced in settlement.
